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Third Circuit's Decision in Roberts v. Fleet Bank:
Thinking Outside of the "Schumer Box" or "Consumerism Gone
Berserk"?
Since the mid-1980's, banks have become dependent on
non-interest income, such as credit card and banking-related fees.'
In fact, nearly half of the operating income of many commercial
banks is derived from non-interest income.2 Consequently, credit
card issuers fiercely compete to win a greater market share by
aggressive marketing techniques.3 "Pre-approved" credit card
solicitations offering "low introductory" interest rates4 or no
annual fees are commonplace in America's mailboxes.5 Consumer
activists refer to these offers as- "bait and switch" or "shark in the
mailbox" tactics that are designed to trick the unwary consumer.6
Credit card marketing efforts have intensified over the past
decade.7 In 1990, 1.1 billion credit card solicitations assailed
1. Future of Banking: Financial Modernization is Occurring Apace Without
New Legislation, 15 BANKING POL'Y REP., July 1, 1996, at 9-10. See also Julie L.
Williams, Before the Mid-Atlantic Bank Compliance Conference (March 22, 2002),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-30a.doc [hereinafter Williams].
Examples of credit card fees are late payment fees, over-the-limit fees, or annual
membership fees; however, banking fees are commissions, application fees, or loan
origination fees. Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Credit Card
Fees Often Go Unnoticed Even As They Increase (June 4, 2001), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/news/cnsprOl/diduknw.html.
2. Williams, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. "Introductory interest rate," or "teaser rate," is a credit card interest rate that
increases to a higher interest rate after a period specified in the cardholder
agreement. See In re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, 180 F.3d 525, 528 (3d Cir.
1999).
5. Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, Advisory Letter AL
2002-3 (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc
[hereinafter Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices].
6. See Jeff Gelles, Consumer Watch Beware credit cards' rate 'promises', PHILA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 31, 2003, at Ell. An example is a Philadelphia school teacher who
accepted a zero percent balance transfer offer which "morphed into a 22.9 percent
loan" once she became delinquent in paying minimum payments on her $12,000
credit card balance. Id.
7. Williams, supra note 1. See Press Release, Synovate, Inc., Credit Card Mail
Volume Drops in 2002 Due to Flat Economy and Worries About Impending War
(June 2, 2003), available at http://www.synovate.com/en/news/ press.details.php?id=9
[hereinafter Synovate Press Release].
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homes in the United States.8 By 2001, credit card solicitation
volume hit an all time high of 5.01 billion, or thirty-nine
solicitations per home.9 Although the sluggish U.S. economy
reduced solicitation volume to 4.86 billion in 2002, the credit card
industry successfully generated 28 million card applications by
direct mail offers (0.58% response rate). '0 Though response rates
have declined slightly," consumer debt and charge-off rates have
steadily risen since 1998.12 In order to wage these massive
marketing campaigns, which are necessary to compete in today's
credit card market, banks must use agents, such as telemarketing
service companies, to market their credit card products and
services. 3 Moreover, banks collaborate with third party vendors,
such as credit protection insurance companies, and offer assorted
products to bank customers.14 Overall, aggressive marketing
efforts by credit card issuers have increased consumer debt-service
burden15 in the past ten years.16 Thus, bank credit card businesses
8. See Synovate Press Release, supra note 7.
9. Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal Banking
Agency Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by
Banks, 58 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1258 n.l (2003) [hereinafter Williams & Bylsma]. Julie L.
Williams is First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D.C., and Michael S. Bylsma is Director
of the Division of Community and Consumer Law of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Washington, D.C. Id.
10. Synovate Press Release, supra note 7.
11. Id.
12. See Consumer Credit, Federal Reserve Statistical Release (Sept. 8, 2003),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G19/20030908/ (last visited Feb. 7,
2004). Consumer debt from revolving lines of credit, or credit cards, was $562.5
billion in 1998. See id. By 2002, this figure increased to $712.0 billion. Id. Second
quarter of 2003 reflects $726.6 billion. Id. As the average credit card interest rate has
deceased from 15.56 percent in 1998 to 12.82 percent in the second quarter of 2002,
more consumers are transferring balances to "refinance" their credit card debt. Id.
Much of this credit card debt has ended in financial disaster; in 1991, 4.68 percent
of all bank credit card accounts ended in charge off. By the second quarter of 2002,
this number has risen to 5.88 percent. "Charge Off Rates, All Banks. Seasonally
Adjusted." Federal Reserve Statistical Release, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/chg-all-sa.txt (last visited Fe. 7,
2004).
13. Williams, supra note 1. See Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices, supra note 5, at 2.
14. Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, supra note 5.
15. Household Debt Service Burden, Federal Reserve Statistical Release (Oct.
22, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/housedebt/default.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004). "The household debt service ratio (DSR) is an estimate of
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have become profitable business ventures as revolving credit card
balances grow.7
These marketing strategies increase the likelihood that a
bank or its agent may engage in unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, which increase customer dissatisfaction and harm to
corporate image. 8  These aggressive marketing efforts have
resulted in civil penalties and government enforcement actions. 9
One such issue was addressed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rossman v. Fleet Bank2' and
Roberts v. Fleet Bank2' when it decided whether credit card issuers
may take advantage of a change-in-terms provision2 of the
cardholder agreement. Until these Third Circuit decisions, the
federal courts did not consider solicitation material in the
"meaningful disclosure" analysis of a violation of the Truth in
Lending Act23 ("TILA") disclosure requirements.24 In fact, prior
the ratio of debt payments to disposable personal income. Debt payments consist of
the estimated required payments on outstanding mortgage and consumer debt." Id.
16. Id. From 1993 to 2003, household debt service payments have increased from
6.09 percent to 7.63 percent of disposable personal income. Id.
17. US credit card issuers release 2002 results, CARDS INT'L, Feb. 25, 2003, at 6.
18. Id. at 2; see Williams, supra note 1.
19. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9.
20. Rossman v. Fleet Bank, 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that (1) Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) requirement that credit card issuers disclose annual, periodic,
and membership fees imposed for issuance or availability of credit card did not
require issuer to disclose any fees which could ever be imposed; (2) further
clarifications were required for issuer to comply with its TILA disclosure
requirements to the extent that terms of cardholder agreement permitted issuer to
dispense with its no-annual-fee promise mid-year; and (3) bait-and-switch allegations
supported claim that issuer's required disclosures were misleading in violation of
TILA).
21. Roberts v. Fleet Bank, 342 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that (1) an issue
of fact existed as to whether issuer's solicitation materials were so misleading as to
violate TILA and its Regulation Z; (2) solicitation materials other than those covered
by TILA can be considered in determining whether credit card issuer has met TILA's
clear-and-conspicuous disclosure requirements; (3) the fact that an issuer in
Cardholder Agreement reserved right to change terms of agreement could not cure
alleged TILA defects in solicitation; (4) cardholder had no cause of action under
Rhode Island unfair trade practices statute; and (5) an issuer did not breach
cardholder agreement).
22. The change of terms provision provides that the bank or lending institution
can change any term, condition, service or feature of the account. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R.
§ 229.6 (2003).
23. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667 (2000).
24. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
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to these recent Third Circuit decisions, many federal and state
courts tempered the possibly expansive definition that the term
"meaningful disclosure" would be afforded in finding a bank in
violation of the TILA.2 ' The Third Circuit's expansion of this term
will have severe consequences on how banks will draft solicitation
materials and disclose key financial data on the TILA form.
This Note will examine the Roberts v. Fleet Bank decision
and the possible impact it may have on credit card TILA
disclosure statements. Part I will explain the history and purpose
of relevant federal statutes affecting credit card disclosure
statements.26 Part II will briefly discuss the background of Roberts
v. Fleet Bank. Part III will assert that the Third Circuit was in
error for applying one of its prior decisions, Rossman v. Fleet
Bank,28 to reach its holding in Roberts and for employing a flawed
interpretation of the TILA and Regulation Z to reach its
conclusions.2 9 Part IV will present suggestions for improved TILA
credit card disclosures after the Roberts decision.3"
I. RELEVANT STATUTES AFFECTING CREDIT CARD DISCLOSURE
STATEMENTS
The Truth in Lending Act is a cornerstone of consumer
credit legislation.31 The TILA allows the consumer to view the
actual costs of credit before making a contractual obligation to
incur debt.32
25. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 31-121 and accompanying text. Specifically, it will address the
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988
("FCCCDA"), the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z, and Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTC Act").
27. See infra notes 122-158 and accompanying text.
28. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 384.
29. See infra notes 159-264.
30. See infra notes 265-284.
31. KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION,
AND EFFECTS 205 (5th Ed. 2000), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/BS&S/Publicat/
PDF/RegsBook2000.pdf [hereinafter SPONG].
32. Richard J. Link, Jr., What Constitutes Violation of Requirements of § 106(b),
(c) of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) (15 U.S.C.S. § 1605(b),(c)) Concerning
Inclusion of Premiums for Life, Accident, or Health Insurance, or for Property
Damage or Liability Insurance, in Determination of Finance Charge, 116 A.L.R. FED.
635 (1993).
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In 1968, after years of legislative haggling and research,
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed TILA into law.33 Enactment
of the TILA marked the birth of modern-day, consumer legislative
activism.34 The TILA drastically eliminated understated interest
rates used by unethical lenders to trap consumers.3" The TILA's
purpose was to "assur[e] meaningful disclosure of credit terms...
and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit
billing and credit card practices. ' '3 6 TILA outlined civil liability for
any creditor who failed to comply with credit disclosure
requirements outlined in the act.37 Rather than passing laws that
imposed limits on credit charges, Congress delegated to the states
the authority to set credit terms.38 Congress did require lenders to
disclose these terms in a uniform manner.3 9 One remedy was to
require a uniform definition of what kinds of credit-related charges
should be included when calculating the Annual Percentage Rate
("APR"), 40 called the actuarial rate applicable to the credit
extension.41 By adopting the actuarial rate as the uniform method
of interest rate calculation and disclosure, Congress believed that
"shopping" for loans would become an easier process to the lay
consumer, thus avoiding the uninformed use of credit.42
33. ELIZABETH RENUART AND KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW
CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING 36 (1999) [hereinafter RENUART & KEEST].
34. John Roddy, Reversing Field: Is There A Trend Toward Abrogating Truth in
Lending?, 772 PLI/CoMM. 637, 639 (1998) (stating that TILA was an effort to "level
the playing field" between consumers and "large corporations").
35. Id. at 33-34. Example: Comparing the cost of $6000 automobile loan. Id. The
dealer with 6% add-on rate = 11.08% APR, the dealer with 6% discount rate =
13.38% APR, and the Credit Union/Bank with 10% actuarial rate = 10.00% APR. Id.
Clearly, the actuarial rate discloses most accurately the cost of the loan to the
consumer and is the rate calculation method adopted by TILA. See id.
36. TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
37. Id. at §§ 1635, 1640.
38. SPONG, supra note 31, at 204.
39. Id.
40. Federal Reserve, Shop: The Credit Card You Pick Could Save You Money
(Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/shop/. An APR
(abbreviation for Annual Percentage Rate) is a measure of the cost of credit
expressed as a yearly rate. Id. Many credit card plans charge different APRs for
credit used in different ways - for example, one APR for purchases, another for cash
advances, and still another for balance transfers. Id. Some plans may increase the
APR if a payment is late. Id.
41. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at 33-34.
42. SPONG, supra note 31, at 205. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
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When designing the TILA, Congress realized that the
management of consumer credit is a day-to-day task. 3 As a result,
Congress delegated broad authority to the Federal Reserve Board
("FRB") to implement TILA provisions.4" Although the purpose
of the statute is well intentioned, the TILA is a complex, technical
body of law and handling these statutory issues involves a number
of sources of law.45 The sources of law include the TILA, the
FRB's Regulation Z (which implements the Act), the Official Staff
Commentary on Regulation Z, and case law interpreting TILA
and its regulations.46
Regulation Z promotes the informed use of consumer
credit by requiring disclosures about its terms and cost.47 The
regulation controls certain credit card practices, and provides a
means for fair and timely resolution of credit billing disputes.4"
Occasionally, Regulation Z leaves TILA questions unanswered.4 9
43. See S. REP. No. 100-259, 100th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3936, 3938.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000). "The Board shall publish model disclosure forms
and clauses for common transactions to facilitate compliance with the disclosure
requirements of this subchapter and to aid the borrower or lessee in understanding
the transaction by utilizing readily understandable language to simplify the technical
nature of the disclosures." Id. See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411
U.S. 356, 365-66, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 1659 (1973) (holding that Congress - in delegating
broad authority to Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations necessary to
render this subchapter effective - gave the Federal Reserve Board the power to
define such classifications as are reasonably necessary to ensure that objectives of this
subchapter are fulfilled).
45. Canaday v. Household Retail Svcs., Inc., 119 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1266 (M.D. Ala.
2000). "When dealing with a complex statute like TILA, it is best for the court to
trust the administering agency to develop appropriate implementing guidelines,
rather than twist the language of the statute beyond its plain meaning." Id. See
RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at 42.
A narrowing of assignee liability is consistent with the overarching
reasons put forth by Congress for amending the TILA in 1980.
Explaining the purpose behind the amendments, the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs noted that
'many creditors have sincerely tried to comply with the act but,
due to its increasing complexity and frequent changes, have
nonetheless found themselves in violation and subject to litigation.'
S. REP. No. 96-73, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 281.
Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corporation, 229 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2000).
46. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at 42.
47. 12 C.F.R. § 266.1 (2003).
48. Id.
49. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 34, at 44.
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Today, Regulation Z implementation and clarification
come from three sources: (1) Regulation Z itself; (2) Official
Board Interpretations of Regulation Z; (3) FRB Official Staff
Commentary.5 ° The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
issues the most authoritative interpretation of Regulation Z; these
interpretations carry the same legal value as the regulation itself.5'
After an amendment to the TILA in 1976,52 FRB Official Staff
Commentaries, written in response to creditor inquiries, provide
civil liability protection to creditors who followed the FRB's
commentaries.53 The FRB Official Staff Commentary54 follows
50. Id.
51. See Aronson v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 180 F.3d 558, 562 (quoting Ford
Motor Credit Co. v Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559-60). "Congress delegated broad
administrative lawmaking power to the Federal Reserve Board when it framed TILA
.... Furthermore, Congress has specifically designated the Federal Reserve Board
and staff as the primary source for interpretation and application of truth-in-lending
law." Id. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
52. See Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197 (1976) (amending TILA § 130(f), 15
U.S.C. § 1640(f)).
53. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at 44. See, e.g., Robert P. Chamness,
Stanley D. Mabbitt & Timothy P. Meredith, Truth in Lending Developments in 1989:
A Year of Interstitial Activity, 45 Bus. LAW. 1831, 1861 (1990).
54. "The Official Staff Commentary is binding and conclusive unless
'demonstrably irrational,' and therefore is 'unwaveringly follow[ed] by the courts."'
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
See also U.S. v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218, 226-38 (2001) (holding that "[wihen
Congress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation, and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally
defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute").
TILA and Regulation Z make no explicit mention of civil liability arising in the
TILA from "misleading" solicitation materials. See infra notes 236-39. Congress
never explicitly intended to include civil liability for misleading solicitation materials.
Id. In fact, Congress did not expressly intend for the TILA to do any more than force
financial institutions to clearly disclose credit financial terms in a uniform tabular
format on credit applications. See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a), (c) (2000) (emphasis added);
12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(a)(2) (2003). Congress expressly delegated authority to FRB to
promulgate regulations to implement TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2000). The Roberts
court left much to be desired regarding the agency deference analysis because the
court cites regulations pertaining to the tabular disclosure requirements, not
solicitation materials, in concluding that the "clear and conspicuous" standard is
applicable to solicitation materials. See Roberts, 342 F.3d at 265-66; see infra notes
238-39. The FRB requires that a credit card issuer "shall make the disclosures
required by this subpart clearly and conspicuously in writing." 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(1)
(2003). Thus, the FRB requires that the APR and certain fees be disclosed "clearly
and conspicuously" in a table, the Schumer Box. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 266. If the
court had deferred to the FRB's interpretation of only applying the "clear and
conspicuous" standard to the TILA disclosure tables and initial disclosure statement,
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each clause of Regulation Z and clarifies the intent of the
regulation by giving examples of its application.55
In 1988, due to changes in consumer credit products and
creditor marketing practices, the TILA was amended by the Fair
Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act ("FCCCDA").56 The
purpose of the amendment was to provide for more specific and
uniform disclosure by credit and charge card issuers with regard to
information relating to interest rates and other fees.5" In the
1980's credit card interest rates skyrocketed along with interest
rates in all other consumer loan products.58 By the late 1980's
interest rates had fallen, yet credit card interest rates remained at
an all-time high.59 Since consumers were not adequately informed
of the credit card product's interest rate and membership fee terms
and conditions, banks were making wide margins on revolving
credit card balances.6 ° In response, Congress amended the TILA
to require that cost disclosures be made earlier, at the time of
application and solicitation.6'
As a result, the TILA mandates that credit card
applications and solicitations sent through the mail disclose "[a]ny
annual fee, other periodic fee, or membership fee imposed for the
issuance or availability of a credit card."62  Further, the TILA
requires that this information be disclosed clearly and
conspicuously in a tabular format, known as the "Schumer Box., 63
then the solicitation materials would not have been included the court's analysis. See
id. at 265-66. However, the agency deference topic is outside the scope of the paper
and will not be discussed in detail.
55. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at 44.
56. See Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583,
102 Stat. 2960 (1988).
57. S. REP. No. 100-259, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3937.
58. Id. at 3938.
59. Id. at 3937. "Not surprisingly, high credit card interest rates have been
translated into high credit card profits. In 1984, 1985 and 1986, credit card loans were
the most profitable of all bank loans, often several times more profitable than other
loans." Id.
60. Id. at 3938-39.
61. Neesa Eileen Feddis, New Credit Card Regs: 18 Questions Answered, AMER.
BANKING J., June 1989, at 14 [hereinafter Feddis]; see also S. REP. No. 100-259,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3937-39.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2000).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(1)(A) (2000); 15 U.S.C. §1632(c) (2000). See Feddis,
supra note 61, at 14.
406 [Vol. 8
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Consistent with TILA, Regulation Z also instructs the creditor to
make the credit card financial disclosures 64  clearly and
conspicuously in writing.65 Regulation Z requires that all credit
card applications or solicitations include an initial disclosure
statement, or IDS. 66 The IDS discloses certain financial data
required under TILA and Regulation Z, such as the computation
method for finance charges and cardholder billing rights.67
Regulation Z requires credit card issuers to disclose in
credit card solicitations or applications "any annual or other
periodic fee, expressed as an annualized amount, or any other fee
that may be imposed for the issuance or availability of a credit or
charge card ... ,68 The regulation also directs the credit card
issuer to provide the APR, fee, grace period, and finance charge
information in a prominent location on or with an application or a
solicitation, and in the form of a table with headings (i.e. the
64. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(1)-(7) (2003).
65. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(1) (2003).
66. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(b)(1) (2003). "(1) Initial disclosures. The creditor shall
furnish the initial disclosure statement required by § 226.6 before the first transaction
is made under the plan." Id.
67. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a)-(e) (2003).
The creditor shall disclose.., to the extent applicable:
(a) Finance charge. The circumstances under which a finance
charge will be imposed and an explanation of how it will be
determined, as follows:
(1) A statement of when finance charges begin to accrue,
including an explanation of whether or not any time
period exists within which any credit extended may be
repaid without incurring a finance charge ...
(2) A disclosure of each periodic rate that may be used to
compute the finance charge...
(3) An explanation of the method used to determine the
balance on which the finance charge may be computed
(4) An explanation of how the amount of any finance
charge will be determined, including a description of how
any finance charge other than the periodic rate will be
determined
(b) Other charges. The amount of any charge other than a finance
charge ....
(c) Security interests ....
(d) Statement of billing rights. A statement that outlines the
consumer's rights and the creditor's responsibilities ....
Id. (emphasis added).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(2) (2003).
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Schumer Box). 69  Also, credit card issuers must disclose this
information either before or at the time the annual fee is posted to
existing accounts.7 °
TILA and Regulation Z also make a distinction between
closed-end and open-end consumer credit.7" Revolving lines of
credit which impose finance charges on an outstanding balance are
considered open-end credit.7 2 Financial institutions offering open-
end credit plans are required to disclose the essential financial
terms of the plan before the consumer's first transaction occurs.73
A statement which itemizes activity and discloses the finance
charges and the billing cycle APR must be regularly received by
consumers with open-end credit accounts.74 Closed-end credit is
defined by exclusion: it is any consumer credit that does not meet
the definition of open-end credit.7 1 Closed-ended loans must
disclose 18 "material" credit terms.76  Six of these items -
including the amount financed, payment schedule, total of
payments, finance charge, APR, and collateral requirements -
carry civil liability exposure if omitted or misstated.77
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 ("FTC Act")"
was enacted in 1914 to prohibit "unfair methods of competition in
commerce."7 9 This Act, however, exempted banks and specific
69. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(1)-(7) (2003). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(a)(2)(i)
(2003). "The disclosures in paragraphs (b)(1) through (7) of this section shall be
provided in a prominent location on or with an application or a solicitation, or other
applicable document, and in the form of a table with headings, content, and format
substantially similar to any of the applicable tables found in Appendix G." Id. See
generally 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(3) (2003) (detailing that disclosures in credit and
charge card applications and solicitations must be provided in a tabular or prominent
location); Feddis, supra note 61, at 14.
70. Feddis, supra note 61, at 14
71. See SPONG, supra note 31, at 205
72. Id. "Typical examples of open-end credit are credit cards, overdraft
protection plans, and home equity lines of credit." Id.
73. Id. at 206.
74. Id. at 207.
75. Id. at 205. "[H]ome purchase loans, home improvement loans, car loans, and
demand loans are examples of closed-end credit." Id.
76. Id. at 208.
77. Id.
78. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000)).
79. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1245 (quoting Id. at 719).
408 [Vol. 8
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businesses from the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC")
authority.8 ° In 1938, the FTC Act was amended to police "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce," but, again, banks
were exempted.8 The Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act of 1975 ("FTC Improvement Act") 82 amended the FTC Act to
require banking agencies to track unfair or deceptive acts or
practices by financial institutions under their supervision and issue
regulations accordingly. 83  Furthermore, it gave the FRB the
authority to decide which FTC regulations prohibiting certain
unfair or deceptive acts or practices would be enforced against
banking institutions.84 The federal bank regulatory agencies8 5 did
not know whether any enforcement action could be brought
against a member bank engaging in unfair or deceptive practices
unless the FRB issued regulations specifying that those practices
were unlawful.86 Thus, whether banks could only violate the FTC
Act without violating a FRB regulation remained an open
question.87
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency ("OCC"), part
of the U.S. Treasury Department, answered that question in 2000
80. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1245.
81. Id.
82. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2000)
[hereinafter FTC Improvement Act].
83. Id.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (with
respect to banks) ... shall prescribe regulations to carry out the
purposes of this section, including regulations defining with
specificity such unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and
containing requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing
such acts or practices.
Id. See also Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1246-47.
84. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1247; see NCNB Nat'l Bank of North
Carolina v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 937 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that borrowers' action
against lender under state Unfair Trade Practices Act was properly dismissed, in that
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System had "authority to promulgate and
enforce regulations to define and prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices by
banks").
85. The national charter banking agencies are the Office of the Comptroller of
Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The OCC is the primary regulator of national banks
pursuant to authority granted by the National Bank Act.
86. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1245.
87. Id. at 1247.
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by finding another means of enforcing the FTC Act through the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDI Act").88 If a nationally
chartered bank engages in a practice that is unfair or deceptive
under the FTC Act, but that is not defined as such in an FRB
regulation, the bank may be found to have violated a law.89
Consequently, the OCC may use its enforcement power under
Section 8 of the FDI Act to address the violation.9" In March 2002,
FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan 91 and Representative John J.
LaFalce92 of the House Committee on Financial Services endorsed
the OCC's position, stating that the "FTC Act's general
prohibition against unfair or deceptive acts or practices applies to
banks as a matter of law;" therefore, federal banking agencies
could enforce section 5 of the FTC Act against its member banks.93
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), regulator
of state non-member banks, followed suit.94 After seventy-six
years, banks were finally included within the ambit of the FTC
88. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1247-48; see also Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2000) [hereinafter FDI Act].
89. See Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1247-48.
If ... the agency has reasonable cause to believe that the
depository institution or any institution-affiliated party is about to
violate, a law, rule, or regulation.., the agency may issue and
serve upon the depository institution or such party a notice of
charges in respect thereof.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (2000).
90. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1247-48. See FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1818(b)(1); see also Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 181 F.Supp.2d
995, 1002 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding that "[i]t is not convincing that the FTC Act of
1914 excluded national banks from FTC jurisdiction, because that broad bank
exclusion operates with respect to banks, not subsidiaries of banks").
91. Biography of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bios/greenspan.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2004).
92. Harris Beach LLP, Attorney Biographies, available at
http://www.harrisbeach.com/attorneys/attorneybio.cfm?aid=276 (last visited Feb. 7,
2004). Congressman LeFalce is currently a partner at Harris Beach LLP law firm as
well as a member of the Financial Institutions and Corporate Practice Groups. Id.
93. Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to Representative John J. LaFalce (May 30, 2002), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2002/20020530/attachment.pdf
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
94. See FDIC Financial Institution Letter, Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts
or Practices, FIL 57-2002 (May 30, 2002), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
financial/2002/fil0257.html [hereinafter FDIC Financial Institution Letter] (on file
with NCBI).
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Act.95 Although a violation of the FTC Act is available to banking
regulators to bring an enforcement action against a bank, no
private cause of action is available under the FTC Act.96 Neither
the TILA nor the FTC Act provide for private causes of action for
unfair and deceptive trade practices or advertising. 97
Every state, in one form or another, has passed laws that
prohibit unfair and deceptive business practices.98 Every business,
including some banks, must be aware of the risk posed by state
unfair and deceptive business practice laws, such as substantial
liability99 based on seemingly harmless promotional, advertising,
and invoicing practices."l° Many of these laws are modeled after
the FTC Act, which places broad discretion in the hands of the
FTC to flush out and enjoin improper trade practices.'' "State
95. See Minnesota ex rel. Hatch, 181 F.Supp.2d at 1001-02; Roberts v. Fleet Bank,
342 F.3d at 269. Two federal courts have made decisions recognizing the OCC's
authority to enforce section 5 of the FTC Act. Id.
96. FTC Act § 45(b). See Mid America Title Co. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. 88
C 5864, 1989 WL 39780, at 2 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that "FTC Act § 45(b)
authorizes only the FTC to proceed against FTC Act violators-the courts have
uniformly held no private cause of action is allowed"); Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d
720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that "The [FTC] Act rests initial remedial power
solely in the Federal Trade Commission"). See also JONATHAN SHELDON &
CAROLYN L. CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
ACTS AND PRACTICES 231 (2001).
97. Jeff Sovern, Private Action Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 444 at n. 21 (1991)
(explaining that not only can consumers not sue under the FTC Act, but also
consumers have no recourse when the Commission declines to bring a case); Steven
W. Bender, Oregon Consumer Protection: Outfitting Private Attorneys General for the
Lean Years Ahead, 73 OR. L. REV. 639, 657 (1994) (stating that "the Federal Truth in
Lending Act imposes technical loan disclosure requirements but neither prohibits nor
remedies deceptive practices"). See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at 33.
98. Richard R. Patch, Consumer Protection Actions: Unfair, Unlawful, and
Deceptive Business Practices 349, 351 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3962), 437 PLI/Pat 349
[hereinafter Richard R. Patch].
99. Id. at 365-67. Including injunctive relief, restitution (such as disgorgement of
profits), actual damages, treble damages, court costs and attorney fees, punitive
damages, other statutory penalties, and, in California, class-wide relief possible even
absent class certification. Id.
100. Id. at 363.
101. Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under "Little
FTC Acts": Should the Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 378-79
(1990) (explaining that the FTC Act has never allowed a private right of action for
either consumer or business litigants and, on this point, the FTC Act and state Little
FTC Acts differ markedly).
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Little FTC Acts place the same discretion in the hands of private
citizens acting as private attorneys general."'' 0 2  Many local
governments, plaintiff's attorneys, and local prosecutors are
aggressive in asserting state UDAP claims due to the lucrative
damage and restitution awards, 103 thus giving a strong incentive to
sue. 104  Consumers and public officials may seek monetary
remedies, and civil penalties. 105 At least forty-seven of the fifty
states expressly authorize private suits under these acts, although
Arkansas, Nevada, and North Dakota appear to be exceptions to
this rule.0 6 Approximately twenty states expressly contemplate
consumer class actions under these statutes. 10 7  Thus, UDAP
statutes provide a flexible, practical remedy for almost any abusive
business practice aimed at consumers.
The Roberts court carefully considered whether the Rhode
Island Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act
("UTPCPA") 10 8 could provide a private remedy for Roberts.' °9
Although the UTPCPA provides that "[u]nfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful,"'' the
Third Circuit concluded that Rhode Island's UTPCPA was
preempted by federal law."' The UTPCPA states that "[n]othing
in this chapter shall apply to actions or transactions permitted
under laws administered by the department of business regulation
or other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority
of this state or the United States."'"12 Combined with its statutory
authority to bring enforcement actions against banks for violations
of law, rule, or regulation,' the OCC has the statutory power to
regulate false and misleading advertising under Section 5 of the
102. Richard R. Patch, supra note 98, at 351-52.
103. Id., at 351, 363.
104. Id., at 363.
105. Id., at 352, 367.
106. Id., at 363.
107. Richard R. Patch, supra note 98, at 363.
108. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1 to 6-13.1-27 (2001).
109. Roberts v. Fleet Bank, 342 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003).
110. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-2 (2001).
111. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 269-70.
112. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-4 (2001).
113. FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (2000). See Roberts, 342 F.3d at 269-70.
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FTC Act," 4 thus placing Fleet Bank, a federally regulated and
nationally chartered bank, within the state statute's "monitor[ed]
by state or federal regulatory bodies or officers" exception." 5
Finally, the Third Circuit held that Roberts had no right of action
against Fleet Bank under Rhode Island UTPCPA to recover for
allegedly misleading consumers concerning the credit card's
interest rate."
16
While Rhode Island state law failed to find a private cause
of action for Roberts, the court found a violation by Fleet Bank
within the overall legislative goal of TILA."7 The Third Circuit's
decision in Roberts will allow judges to include credit card
solicitation materials in conjunction with the Schumer Box and
IDS to flush out a TILA violation." 8 Under the FTC Act, a
consumer victimized by an unfair and deceptive trade practice
would file a complaint to the Federal Trade Commission, or the
proper bank regulatory agency, and await government
enforcement action against the FTC Act violator." 9 Now, Roberts
will allow class action suits to be filed based upon conflicting
language between the solicitation and the TILA disclosure
materials. 20 Thus, the line is blurring between the TILA and the
FTC Act.'2'
114. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 270.
115. Id. at 269-70; see also R.I.GEN.Laws § 6-13.1-4, available at
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE6/6-13.1/INDEX.HTM. See also State v.
Piedmont Funding Corp., 119 R.I. 695, 382 A.2d 819, 822 (1978) (holding that based
on the plain meaning of § 6-13.1-4, the Legislature clearly exempted from the Act all
those activities and businesses which are subject to monitoring by state or federal
regulatory bodies or officers).
116. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 270.
117. See id. at 267.
118. Id. at 267-69; see MaryClaire Dale, Credit-Card Lawsuit Reinstated,
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Aug. 30, 2003, at B01 [hereinafter MaryClaire Dale].
119. Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public
Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 16-18
(1985).
120. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 267-69.
121. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1257 n.84.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: ROBERTS V.
FLEET BANK
In May 1999, Denise Roberts received a packet of
solicitation materials for a new Fleet Bank Titanium
MasterCard.122 The packet included an "introductory flyer," a
solicitation letter, a Pre-Qualified Invitation, and an Initial
Disclosure Statement ("IDS"), which is required under
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b).123 The introductory flyer and
IDS stated that the credit card would charge a Fixed Annual
Percentage Rate of 7.99% on purchases and balance transfers.
24
In addition to the flyer, the solicitation letter and invitation form
again restated that the Annual Percentage Rate would be 7.99%
Fixed. 25
In compliance with TILA,126 the invitation form listed the
"TERMS OF PRE-QUALIFIED OFFER" and the
"CONSUMER INFORMATION" sections. 27  The first two
sentences of the "TERMS OF PRE-QUALIFIED OFFER"
stated:
I request a Fleet Titanium MasterCard account
upon acceptance of my request by Fleet Bank (RI),
National Association in Rhode Island. I agree to the
terms of the Cardholder Agreement mailed with my
Card, including those which provide that the
Cardholder Agreement and may [sic] account will
be governed by Rhode Island and Federal law and
that my Agreement terms (including rates) are
subject to change.2 8
122. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 262-63.
123. Id. at 263.
124. Id. at 263.
125. Id.
126. Infra note 213 and accompanying text. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b) (2003).
127. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 263.
128. Id.(emphasis added).
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The "CONSUMER INFORMATION" section, located on
the back of the application, contained the Schumer Box. 129 The
Schumer Box is the table of basic credit card information required
under the TILA, as amended by the FCCDA. 3 ° The Schumer
Box displayed a column with the heading "Annual Percentage
Rate (APR) for Purchases and Balance Transfers."'' The box
immediately underneath the heading disclaimed that "7.99%
APR" was the applicable rate.3 2 Inside the Schumer Box, Fleet
listed two circumstances under which that rate could be increased:
"(1) if the prospective cardholder failed to meet any repayment
requirements; or (2) upon closure of the account." 133 Fleet Bank
did not list any other circumstances in the Schumer Box in which it
could increase the APR. 13 4
In June 1999, Roberts received her Fleet Titanium
MasterCard and the accompanying Cardholder Agreement."'
After her application had been received and approved by the
bank, Roberts signed a credit card agreement that contained an
express provision giving Fleet Bank the right to change the interest
rate.'36 "Section 10 of the Agreement, titled 'Annual Percentage
Rate,' indicated that the APR would be 7.99%. ''137 Again, in
Section 10, Fleet Bank repeated that it reserved the right to
129. Joseph W. Gelb & Peter N. Cubita, Credit Card Application and Solicitation
Disclosure Legislation: An Alternative to the Rate Ceiling Approach, 43 Bus. LAW.
1557, 1561 (1988). The "Schumer Box" is the tabular disclosure of certain credit
terms that must be made in credit card applications and solicitations pursuant to the
Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988. Brief of Appellee, infra note
182, at 122 n.ll. The tabular chart required under the TILA has become popularly
referred to as the "Schumer Box" in honor of the principal sponsor of the House bill,
Congressman, now Senator, Charles Schumer. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 263.
130. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 263.
131. Id. at 263.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 264.
135. Id.
136. Roberts v. Fleet Bank, No. CIV. A. 00-6142, 2001 WL 892846, at *1 (E.D.Pa.,
Jun. 5, 2001) (holding that the credit card agreement which Roberts signed, after her
application had been received and approved, also contained an express provision
giving the defendant the right to change the interest rate; therefore, defendant did
not violate the disclosure requirements of the TILA, or any other provision of that
statute).
137. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 264.
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change the rate under the two specific circumstances.'38 However,
in Section 24 of the Cardholder Agreement, entitled "Change in
Terms," Fleet stated:
We have the right to change any of the terms of this
Agreement at any time. You will be given notice of
a change as required by applicable law. Any change
in terms governs your Account as of the effective
date, and will, as permitted by law and at our
option, apply both to transactions made on or after
such date and to any outstanding Account
balance.139
Fleet later sent a letter to Roberts notifying her that Fleet
would be increasing the fixed-rate APR. 40 In July 2000, over a
year after Roberts had received her card, Fleet increased the
"fixed rate" APR to 10.5%.i4l
On December 5, 2000, Roberts filed a class action suit
claiming violations of the TILA and the Rhode Island Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act.'42 On June 5, 2001,
the district court dismissed her claims under the TILA.143 The
court reasoned that Roberts received adequate notice that the
bank reserved the right to change the terms of the original
agreement." 4 On November 20, 2001, the district court dismissed
her state law claims for violation of the Rhode Island Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act and breach of contract. 145
The court decided that Roberts could not pursue a claim for
violation of the Rhode Island Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act (UTPCPA) because that state statute
did not apply to transactions that are otherwise subject to
138. Id.
139. Id. (italics added).
140. Id.
141. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 264.
142. Id.
143. Roberts, No. CIV. A. 00-6142, 2001 WL 892846, at *2.
144. Id. at *1.
145. Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.), No. CIV. A. 00-6142, 2001 WL 1486226, at *1
(E.D. Pa. 2001).
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regulation by a "regulatory body or officer acting under statutory
authority of [Rhode Island] or the United States."' 146 Fleet Bank, a
nationally chartered bank regulated by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), fell within that exemption
and was not subject to the UTPCPA statute. 147  Soon after,
Roberts appealed.
148
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in an August 2003
opinion, overturned the district court's decision, thus allowing
Denise Roberts to pursue a class-action lawsuit against Fleet
Credit Card Services. 149  The Third Circuit concluded that the
TILA permitted a judge to consider solicitation content outside of
the Schumer Box to determine if the credit issuer disclosed the
required information "clearly and conspicuously."' 5 ° In reaching
146. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-4).
147. Id.
148. Roberts v. Fleet Bank, 342 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2003).
149. See MaryClaire Dale, supra note 118.
150. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 268. "When Congress decided to require credit card
issuers to disclose required terms in a clear and conspicuous manner, we doubt that it
intended for us to ignore other statements made by those issuers in their credit card
solicitation materials." Id. "Clear and Conspicuous standard" means that the
disclosures must be "in a reasonably understandable form and readily noticeable to
the consumer." Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R Pt. 226, Supp. I,
cmt. 5a(a)(2) (2003).
An interesting commentary on the "reasonable consumer" and "clear and
conspicuous" standards was made by Circuit Judge Easterbrook of the United States
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1999:
[t]he legal standard under the Truth in Lending Act is the
objective "reasonable person" approach, see Cash Store
Management, 195 F.3d at 327-28. More to the point, § 226.17(a)(2)
has nothing to do with borrowers' comprehension. What is "more
conspicuous than any other disclosure" depends on the contents of
the form, not on how it affects any particular reader. See Herrera
v. First Northern Savings & Loan Ass'n, 805 F.2d 896, 900 (10th
Cir.1986), and Dixey v. Idaho First National Bank, 677 F.2d 749
(9th Cir.1982), both of which treat compliance with § 226.17(a)(2)
as a legal rather than factual matter ....
[T]he premise of the statute and regulations is that one size fits
all; a form complies or it doesn't, and the fact that some or even
many of the recipients are abnormal in their perception of
"conspicuousness" does not affect the form's validity. Thus the
inquiry must be objective, which makes the question legal rather
than factual.
If we were to treat the determination of conspicuousness as a
matter of "fact," then the regulation would fail in its purpose. No
matter what a lender did, a borrower could say that to his eyes the
combination of color, typeface, spacing, size, style, underlining,
418 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 8
its decision, the Third Circuit relied heavily on its earlier decision
in Rossman v. Fleet Bank, where the court began reading required
TILA disclosure forms in conjunction with solicitation materials to
root out a TILA violation by a lender.15' The Roberts court
compared the two cases and concluded that a material question of
fact existed whether Fleet Bank accurately disclosed the Annual
Percentage Rate, thus precluding summary judgment.152
The Third Circuit agreed with Roberts that the
introductory letter in the solicitation packet could confuse a
"reasonable consumer."'5 3 The court held that: (1) an issue of fact
existed as to whether the issuer's solicitation materials were so
misleading as to violate the TILA and its regulations; (2) the
solicitation materials other than those covered by the TILA could
be considered in determining whether the credit card issuer met
the TILA's clear-and-conspicuous disclosure requirements; and (3)
the fact that the issuer reserved in the Cardholder Agreement and
IDS the right to change the terms of agreement did not cure the
alleged TILA defects in the solicitation.
154
Since the credit card solicitation from Fleet disclosed only
two conditions upon which Fleet could increase the APR,'55 the
capitalization, border, and placement made one feature of the
agreement stand out relative to the mandatory disclosures, or
emphasized one disclosure over another .... The Federal Reserve
has included many sample forms in its regulations, but if the effect
of typeface and type placement is open to fact-finding, then even
the model forms are not safe.
Smith v. Check-N-Go of Illinois, Inc., 200 F.3d 511, 514-515 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a single circle placed around the due date by the lender - the piece of
information most vital to the consumer once the loan has been made, for failure to
repay on time can lead to penalties - does not turn a model form into a violation of
TILA) (italics added).
151. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 266-68.
152. Id. at 269.
153. Id. at 268. See Bustamante v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 619 F.2d 360, 364
(5th Cir.1980) (applying "reasonable consumer" standard includes protection for the
"unsophisticated or uneducated consumer"); see generally Rossman, 280 F3d at 394
(stating that "reasonably understandable" does not require that they be
understandable by the average consumer; instead, disclosures must be reasonably
understandable "in light of the inherent difficulty or complexity of the information
disclosed"). (emphasis added).
154. See Roberts, 342 F.2d at 266-69.
155. MaryClaire Dale, supra note 118, at B01. "The application included a
'Schumer Box' the table of basic information required under the federal Truth in
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Third Circuit's concern was whether Fleet might have misled
potential consumers by indicating that the rate could only change
in the instances it specified in the solicitation materials." 6 After
reading the solicitation materials together as a whole, the court
believed a question of fact existed as to whether Fleet made any
misleading statements in the solicitation by failing to disclose
information "clearly and conspicuously" pursuant to TILA's
requirements.157 The Third Circuit reversed the ruling of the
district court on the TILA claim and affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to Fleet on the state law claims. 5 8
III. ANALYSIS OF ROBERTS DECISION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT GIVES
BIRTH TO A NEW PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE TILA
A. The Third Circuit Court's Misapplication of Rossman v.
Fleet Bank
In late 1999, plaintiff Paula Rossman received a Pre-
Qualified Invitation in the mail soliciting her to apply for a credit
card from Fleet Bank. 59 The solicitation advertised a "Fleet
Platinum MasterCard" with a low APR and "no annual fee., 160 If
the recipient was interested in applying he or she checked a box
that indicated, "YES! I want the top card for genuine value and
superior savings, the no-annual-fee Platinum MasterCard."' 6' An
asterisk directed the recipient of the credit card solicitation to a
note below that said, "See the TERMS OF PRE-QUALIFIED
Lending Act that listed only two reasons the rate could change: if the consumer failed
to meet repayment rules or closed the account." Id.
156. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 268.
157. Id. at 269. "[W]e agree with Roberts that the claims in the introductory letter
that the 'fixed 7.99% APR' is 'NOT an introductory offer' and 'won't go up in just a
few short months' could cause a reasonable consumer to be confused about the
temporal quality of the offer." Id. at 268.
158. Id. at 271. Roberts also alleged violation of the Rhode Island Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
Id. at 269-71.
159. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 387.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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OFFER and CONSUMER INFORMATION for detailed rate and
other information."'
162
The enclosure entitled "Consumer Information" contained
the Schumer Box, the table of important credit card financial
information which is required by TILA after it was amended by
the FCCCD Act of 1988.163 The Schumer Box contained a column
with the heading "Annual Fee," just below it a box contained only
the word "None."'" Outside the Schumer box in the "Consumer
Information" enclosure, Fleet Bank listed other applicable fees.
165
The "Consumer Information" enclosure also disclaimed, "We
[Fleet] reserve the right to change the benefit features associated
with your Card at any time.'
166
Rossman responded to Fleet's offer, and received her "no-
annual-fee Platinum MasterCard" in December 1999 or January
2000.167 Along with the card, Fleet sent Rossman a "Cardholder
Agreement.' ' 168 Paragraph 15 of the Agreement stated that: "No
annual membership fee will be charged to your Account.'
169
The Cardholder Agreement, in paragraph 24, again
disclosed the change-in-terms provision, which said "[w]e have the
right to change any of the terms of this Agreement at any time."' 170
In May 2000, Rossman received a second letter giving her notice
that on the "next anniversary date of your account opening," the
account would be charged an annual membership fee. 7' At this
point, Rossman was unable to walk away from her credit
arrangement since she was carrying a balance on the credit card.
7 2
162. Id.
163. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 387.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 388.
168. Id.
169. See Rossman, No. CIV. A. 00-CV-3879, at *1, 2000 WL 33119419 (E.D.Pa.,
Dec. 29, 2000) (holding that Rossman did not allege that Fleet engaged in conduct
expressly prohibited by any of the substantive sections of the TILA, motion granted
to dismiss to Fleet Bank).
170. Id. (italics added).
171. Id. at *2.
172. Steven P. Bann, Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) National Association, No. 01-
1094, 'No Annual Fee" Credit Application Implies No Fee For At Least A Year, 167
N.J.L.J. 648, Feb. 18, 2002, at 60.
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On June 20, 2000, in a third letter, Fleet announced a modification
of its first change letter saying the annual membership fee would
be assessed in the next billing cycle (July 2000).' By July 6, 2000,
in accordance with the second letter, a $35.00 fee was charged to
Rossman's account.
174
Rossman commenced a putative class action on July 31,
2000, alleging that Fleet violated the TILA by offering a credit
card at no annual fee and failing to disclose the fee imposed
shortly thereafter.175 Rossman claimed that the concealment of the
annual fee was part of a "bait and switch" operation in which,
argued Rossman, Fleet induced customers to open Fleet accounts
"with the bait of a no annual fee credit card," and then switched
the terms of the Cardholder Agreement after a consumer opened
an account. 176 The district court dismissed Rossman's TILA count
for failure to state a valid TILA claim.
177
The Third Circuit, finding that a TILA claim was stated,
reversed the district court's dismissal. 78 The Third Circuit held
that "no annual fee" is reasonably understood to imply a term of
one year because the initial offer was for a card with "no annual
fee."179 The offer, the court said, did not clearly and conspicuously
reflect that the bank's reserved right to charge an annual fee to
Rossman after the one-year term. 80
173. Rossman, No. Civ. A. 00-CV-3879, 2000 WL 33119419, at *2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *3.
The Truth in Lending Act does not provide a cause of action when
a lender engages in 'bait and switch' techniques. It does require
that the lender make certain disclosures with respect to the offered
terms. Fleet's disclosures in late 1999 were accurate with respect to
the terms offered at that time; the fact that Fleet allegedly intended
to change those terms in the near future did not render the
disclosures inaccurate for purposes of the TILA ... Plaintiff has
not alleged that Fleet engaged in conduct expressly prohibited by
any of the substantive sections of the TILA. Accordingly, the
Court will grant Fleet's "Motion to Dismiss Truth In Lending Act
Claim."
Id. (additional emphasis added) (citations omitted).
178. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 400.
179. Steven P. Bann, supra note 172, at 60.
180. Id.
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Although there are some factual similarities between the
two cases,'81 the Third Circuit's recent use of Rossman in reaching
its holding in Roberts is ineffective and unconvincing for two
reasons. First, the Third Circuit stated in Rossman that the offer
of a "no-annual-fee" credit card is "fairly understood to contain an
implied term of a year."' 182  Moreover, the Rossman court
concluded that the "no annual fee" statement, which reflected
"None," in the Schumer Box was "not a clear and conspicuous
disclosure of a set of contract terms that permit the imposition of
an annual fee within a year.'1 83 In Roberts, however, the TILA
disclosures stated that there was a "7.99% Annual Percentage
Rate," but did not imply that the APR would remain unchanged
for any period. 84 Indeed, the "TERMS OF PRE-QUALIFIED
OFFER" referred to the Cardholder Agreement, subsequently
mailed with the card, disclosed that all terms, including rates, were
subject to change. 85  Furthermore, the Annual Percentage Rate
was changed thirteen months after the card was issued, thus
satisfying the "implied term of a year" reasoning asserted in
Rossman'86 The disclosure of a "7.99% APR" in the Schumer
Box was not misleading with respect to the duration of the offer
181. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 267.
Fleet argued to the Court that a clear and conspicuous statement
of its authority to change the annual fee at any time was
unnecessary because the change-in-terms provision of the
agreement is not among the terms that must be disclosed in tabular
format under the TILA. In rejecting this argument, the Court
stated that the issue was "not Fleet's obligation to disclose the
change-in-terms provision, but its obligation to disclose annual
fees."
Similarly, in this case, the issue is not Fleet's obligation to
disclose the change-in-terms provision, but its obligation to
disclose the APR.
Id. (citations omitted).
182. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 394. See Burt M. Rublin, Brief for Appellee in Roberts
v. Fleet Bank 91, 102 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 01-
4420), WL 1361 PLI/Corp 91 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee].
183. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 394 (stating that a reasonable consumer would be
entitled to assume upon reading Fleet's solicitation that the issuer was committed to
refraining from imposing an annual fee for at least one year. The statement "no
annual fee" implies a term of one year without an annual fee).
184. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 263.
185. Id.
186. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 394
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since none of the TILA disclosures made an express or implied
representation regarding the duration of that offer.187 Thus, the
nature of the violation found in Rossman is distinguishable from
the violation found in Roberts.188
Second, the Rossman Court based its TILA ruling on the
Rossman's "bait and switch" allegations.'89 The court stated that
"even if the language of the disclosures did not imply that Fleet
was obligated for at least a year" to refrain from charging an
annual fee, then "the disclosures were misleading with respect to
Fleet's alleged intentions" at the time of the solicitation to impose
an annual fee shortly after Rossman had opened her account.19
Fleet allegedly "solicited her business with the no-annual-fee offer
while intending to change the terms shortly thereafter."19' By
contrast, Roberts did not allege a "bait and switch" by Fleet.192
Based on the "bait and switch" allegations asserted in Rossman,
the Third Circuit stated:
A reasonable consumer would expect that, even if
the terms may change, the stated terms are those
that the card issuer intends to provide. The
disclosures - we assume for these purposes - feigned
an intention to provide credit under a set of terms
that Fleet did not intend to provide over time.
Thus, even if the language of the disclosures did not
imply that Fleet was obligated for at least a year, the
disclosures were misleading with respect to Fleet's
alleged intentions. 93
The Third Circuit should have recognized that the Rossman
decision was distinguishable from Roberts. First, Roberts did not
make a "bait and switch" allegation against Fleet and, second, the
187. Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 126.
188. Id., at 126-27.
189. Id., at 97.
190. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 396; see Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 103.
191. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 396.
192. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 97.
193. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 397.
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factual circumstances leading up to the alleged TILA violations
were dissimilar. 194
In fact, the Rossman decision lends support to Fleet Bank's
argument in Roberts. For example, Fleet's solicitation disclosure
of a 7.99% APR accurately "reflect[ed] the terms of the legal
obligation between the parties." 195  The solicitation Roberts
received precisely "reflect[ed] the credit terms to which the parties
[were] legally bound at the time of giving the disclosures" '196 in
May 1999. Changing the terms of the Agreement thirteen months
after Roberts received the Cardholder Agreement does not affect
the accuracy of the previously made terms. 97  Furthermore,
Rossman stated that the TILA disclosures do not need to
anticipate future changes in the terms of the lending agreement. 98
"[T]wo unique circumstances" which were the basis for the Third
Circuit's conclusion in Rossman are "absent in Roberts."199
194. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 152. "As plaintiff acknowledged in
her brief in opposition to Fleet's motion to dismiss, 'Plaintiff, however, is not alleging
bait and switch' and 'Plaintiff's TILA claim is not premised on Defendants' intent to
change the APR later."' Id.
195. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 390.
196. Id. at 391.
197. Id. at 392. In fact, the Third Circuit in Rossman recognized that "a future
change in terms need not be anticipated in disclosures." Id. at 393.
198. Id. at 393. State and federal courts have regularly enforced change-in-terms
provisions for open-end credit. Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 305 (Del.
Super. 1998) (holding that credit card issuer did not act unlawfully by offering a low
fixed APR of 11.9% that it later increased to 16.9% pursuant to a change in terms
clause); Bank One v. Coates, 125 F.Supp.2d 819, 831 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (holding that
the cardholder agreement stated simply, unambiguously and without limitation, that
Bank One could change or amend the terms of the Agreement); see also Marsh v.
First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909, 921 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that
arbitration agreement added by way of amendment to credit card agreement was
enforceable); Herrington v. Union Planters Bank N.A., 113 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1031
(S.D. Miss. 2000) (holding that arbitration agreement added to account agreement
via amendment is enforceable); cf. Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574
(W.D.N.C. 2000) (holding that authorized amendments to credit card agreement
which first added and then modified an arbitration agreement were enforceable).
But see DeMando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
lowering then, 2 years later, raising interest rate for existing cardholder a violation of
Regulation Z when the change-in-terms notice contained terms that were in violation
of the credit agreement); Hubbard v. Fidelity Fed. Bank, 91 F.3d 75, 79 (9th Cir.
1996) (credit lender liable under TILA for subsequent disclosures, or change-in-
terms notice, that failed accurately to reflect the legal obligation of the parties).
199. Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 111.
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Therefore, the Roberts court's holding did not conform to the
rationale and analysis in the Rossman decision.2°
B. The Court's Misinterpretation of the TILA and Regulation Z
The Third Circuit's decision in Roberts raises several issues,
the most important of which is whether the holding is consistent
with the provisions outlined in the TILA and Regulation Z. The
TILA and Regulation Z mandate clear and conspicuous disclosure
of the annual percentage rate and other applicable fees in a table
(the Schumer Box) and the IDS.20 ' The Third Circuit agreed with
Roberts that a material issue was raised as to whether the Schumer
Box "failed to clearly and conspicuously" notify a reasonable
consumer that "the 7.99% APR was subject to change at any
time., 2°2 The Schumer Box included in the solicitation Roberts
received in the mail disclosed only two conditions under which
Fleet could raise her APR.23 The solicitation, however, did not
disclose the change-in-terms provision in the Schumer Box, but did
disclose the location of the change-in-terms provision in the IDS.
2°
Based on this omission in the Schumer Box, the court believed
that a "reasonable consumer could read this list as exhaustive and
conclude that the 7.99% APR could be raised only under those
two described circumstances., 20 5  Citing Rossman, the Third
Circuit declared that the TILA was designed to assure meaningful
disclosures and "[tihe accuracy demanded excludes not only literal
falsities, but also misleading statements.
2 0 6
200. Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 111.
201. See Roberts, 342 F.3d at 265-66. The tabular chart required under the TILA
has become popularly referred to as the "Schumer Box" in honor of the principal
sponsor of the House bill, Congressman, now Senator, Charles Schumer. Id. at 263
n.1.
202. Id. at 266.
203. Id. at 263. "[The] solicitation materials stated only two conditions under
which Fleet could raise Roberts' APR: (1) failure of the cardholder to meet any
repayment requirement; or (2) upon closure of the account. Roberts argues that,
because a reasonable consumer could read this list as exhaustive." Id. at 266.
204. Id. at 264. Infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
205. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 266. See supra note 203.
206. Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437, 443 (3d Cir. 1977).
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Regulation Z § 226.9(c) determines whether the creditor
must make a new disclosure when a term in the initial disclosure
statement, or IDS, is changed. 27 Regulation Z permits creditors to
make subsequent changes to the terms and conditions that apply
to a cardholder's account through a change-in-terms notice.2°8 The
Roberts court assumes that Fleet Bank was permitted by law to
disclose the change-in-terms provision in the Schumer Box; 2 °9
however, Regulation Z limits the information that may be
included in the Schumer Box. 20 Regulation Z states that "only the
207. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c) (2003).
(c) Change in terms-
(1) Written notice required. Whenever any term required
to be disclosed under § 226.6 is changed or the required
minimum periodic payment is increased, the creditor
shall mail or deliver written notice of the change to each
consumer who may be affected. The notice shall be
mailed or delivered at least 15 days prior to the effective
date of the change . . . [T]he notice shall be given,
however, before the effective date of the change.
(2) Notice not required. No notice under this section is
required when the change involves late payment charges,
charges for documentary evidence, or over-the-limit
charges; a reduction of any component of a finance or
other charge; suspension of future credit privileges or
termination of an account or plan; or when the change
results from an agreement involving a court proceeding,
or from the consumer's default or delinquency (other
than an increase in the periodic rate or other finance
charge).
Id. (italics added).
208. Id.
209. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 266-67.
210. 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2000). "Information required by this subchapter shall be
disclosed clearly and conspicuously, in accordance with regulations of the Board." Id.
(emphasis added); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(1) (2003). "The creditor shall make the
disclosures required by this subpart clearly and conspicuously in writing, in a form
that the consumer may keep." Id. See, e.g., Mark A. Aronchick, Brief of Amici
Curiae American Bankers Association, American Financial Services Association,
and Consumer Bankers Association in Support of Affirmance of the District Court's
Decisions Granting Judgment in Favor of Appellees, Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.)
(No. 00-CV-6142), at 4 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers
Association]. See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568-69
(1980) (holding that task of "striking the proper balance is an empirical process that
entails investigation into consumer psychology and that presupposes broad
experience with credit practices. Administrative agencies are better suited than [the]
courts to engage in such a process") (quotation omitted); Household Finance Corp. v.
Buck, 437 N.E.2d 425, 429 (I11. App. 1982) (holding that TILA and Regulation Z are
violated if statutory terms are unclear and meaningless to the consumer).
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information required or permitted in this section" may be placed
in the Box and then, "[t]he table containing the disclosures
required by § 226.5a [the Schumer Box] should contain only the
information required or permitted by this section... [o]ther credit
information may be presented on or with an application or
solicitation, provided such material appears outside the table.,
21
Neither the TILA nor Regulation Z requires the disclosure of the
change-in-terms provision in any of the required disclosures
included with credit card applications and solicitations.212 While
Regulation Z does not impose any obligation to disclose a change-
in-terms provision at the time a credit card account is solicited or
opened, it does impose "subsequent disclosure requirements"
when a change-in-terms is implemented pursuant to such a
provision." 3 Furthermore, the clear and conspicuous standard
only applies to required disclosures.214  Since a change-in-terms
provision is not a required disclosure item in the Schumer Box or
the IDS,21 5 the "clear and conspicuous" standard would not
apply. 21
6
Certainly, a TILA violation would have occurred had the
change-in-terms provision been included in the Schumer Box
under the APR heading.217 Regulation Z requires the APRs for
purchase transactions, cash advances, balance transfers, and any
penalty rates to be prominently disclosed in the Schumer Box and
211. Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, Cmt. 226.5a(a)(2)-4
[hereinafter Official Staff Interpretations]; Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers
Association, supra note 210, at 5-6.
. 212. Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 125. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c), (e) (2000);
12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b) (2003) (listing the required "Schumer Box" disclosures for
credit card applications and solicitations); Official Staff Commentary, Comment
226.5a(a)(2)-4; 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, App. G, Model Forms 10(A) and 10(B).
213. Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers Association, supra note 210, at 7.
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (requires 15 days' notice of changes in terms involving
increases in charges).
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(1) (2003).
215. 12 C.F.R. § 225a(b) (2003); 15 U.S.C. 1637(c) (2000).
216. Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 123.
217. See Official Staff Interpretations, supra note 211 and accompanying text.
Official Staff Comment, 65 Fed. Reg. 58905-11, (Oct. 3, 2000) available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2000-register&docid=0-
25316-filed.pdf [hereinafter Official Staff Comment]. "To simplify the table, the
existing commentary is revised so that only the penalty rates can appear inside the
table; the explanatory information must appear outside the table." Id.
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on the same page. 2 8  However, balance transfer, over-the-limit,
cash advance, and late fees may be disclosed clearly and
conspicuously in or outside the table, but the disclosures must start
on the same page as the table and may continue on subsequent
pages. 29 Furthermore, Regulation Z states that subsequent events
that make a disclosure inaccurate after the creditor has mailed the
disclosure is not a violation.22 °
To ensure that consumers receive meaningful disclosures
on a consistent basis, comment 5a(a)(2)-1 221  provides that
disclosures in the IDS and Schumer Box are clear and conspicuous
if they are both understandable and readily noticeable to the
average consumer acting reasonably.222 On the application form
Roberts completed, immediately above the signature line, it stated,
"I (we, if any co-applicant) have read and agree to the TERMS OF
PRE-QUALIFIED OFFER., 223  Fleet clearly and conspicuously
disclosed above the Schumer Box in the "TERMS OF PRE-
QUALIFIED OFFER" that "my Agreement terms (including
rates) are subject to change., 224  The change-in-terms provision
was explicitly disclosed in the "TERMS OF PRE-QUALIFIED
218. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b) (2003). See also Official Staff Comment, supra note
217, at 58906-7. 15 U.S.C. § 1663 states:
No advertisement., of consumer credit under an open end credit
plan may set forth any of the specific terms of that plan unless it
also clearly and conspicuously sets forth all of the following items:
(1) Any minimum or fixed amount which could be imposed. (2) In
any case in which periodic rates may be used to compute the
finance charge, the periodic rates expressed as annual percentage
rates. (3) Any other term that the Board may by regulation require
to be disclosed."
Id. (emphasis added). Accord Advertising, 12 C.F.R. § 226.16 (2003).
219. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(8)-(11) (2003). See also Official Staff Comment, supra
note 216, at 58905.
220. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5. "(e) Effect of subsequent events. If a disclosure becomes
inaccurate because of an event that occurs after the creditor mails or delivers the
disclosures, the resulting inaccuracy is not a violation of this regulation, although new
disclosures may be required under § 226.9(c)." Id. (italics added).
221. See Official Staff Comment, supra note 217, at 58905.
222. Id.
223. Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 124 (capitalization in original
solicitation).
224. Brief of Appellee, supra note 182, at 124.
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OFFER" section in the same sized print as the required
disclosures in the Schumer Box.
z25
The TILA requires courts to apply the "clear and
conspicuous" standard to assess the adequacy of required
disclosure statements in the IDS and Schumer Box.
226
"Conspicuousness is a question of law under the TILA that is
governed by an objective, reasonable person standard., 227  Until
the Third Circuit's decisions in Rossman and Roberts, federal
courts did not consider solicitation material as part of the TILA
disclosure statement.2 28  The courts determined whether the
reasonable consumer, the cardholder, ought to have noticed the
term or clause written on the TILA disclosure statement. 229  A
225. Id. at 124-25.
226. See Stein v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 279 F.Supp.2d 286, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding that TILA requires meaningful disclosure of credit terms, meaning
balance between complete disclosure and information overload; such a balance does
not require disclosure of all terms of potential interest); Miller v. European
American Bank, 921 F. Supp. 1162, 1166-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
"meaningful disclosure" of credit terms, as required by TILA, did not extend to
disclosure of terms and conditions of offer of travel certificate made to induce
customer to enter into credit card arrangement); see also Hale v. MBNA Am. Bank,
N.A., No. 99 Civ. 8831 (AGS), 2000 WL 1346812, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2000)
(holding that failure to disclose information about treatment of credit balances not
violative of TILA); see, e.g., Schnall v. Marine Midland Bank, 225 F.3d 263, 269-70
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that failing to disclose periodic rates applicable to
promotional offer in promotion letter did not violate TILA as promulgated by the
FRB under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)).
227. Harper v. Lindsay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, LLC, 212 F.Supp.2d 582, 588 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (holding that used car seller's failure to provide TILA disclosures in
writing on a document separate from a retail installment sales contract (RISC) did
not violate TILA).
228. See Miller, 921 F. Supp. at 1166-67.
229. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (2000). "'Conspicuous.' A term or clause is conspicuous
when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to
have noticed it." Id.; see 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201 (2003). "A printed heading
in capitals (as: NONNEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language
in the body of a form is conspicuous if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.
But in a telegram any stated term is conspicuous. Whether a term or clause is
conspicuous or not is for decision by the court." Id.; see Borden, Inc. v. Advent Ink
Co. , 701 A.2d 255, 259 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating that Pennsylvania law defines
conspicuous as reasonable person should have noticed it included disclaimer's
placement in document, size of disclaimer's print, and whether disclaimer was
highlighted by being printed in all capital letters or in type style or color different
from remainder of document); see also Applebaum v. Nissan Motor Acceptance
Corp., 226 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing that "The Uniform Commercial Code
defines "conspicuous" as 'so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to
operate ought to have noticed it') (quoting the U.C.C.).
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credit card issuer may add non-promotional information to the
required disclosures without violating the clear and conspicuous
standard. ° In addition, if a lender includes a change-in-terms
provision in the required Cardholder Agreement, a subsequent
change to the agreement does not constitute a violation of the
clear and conspicuous standard.23' Consumers misled by other
promotional inducements in solicitations, such as deceptive
promises of gifts, may find a remedy under state law, such as unfair
or deceptive acts and practices ("UDAP") statutes, but not under
the TILA.232
The Third Circuit dismissed Fleet's argument that the
"clear and conspicuous" standard only applied to required
disclosures in the IDS and Schumer Box. 233 The court said that it
was the intention of Congress to allow judges to look outside the
IDS and Schumer Box to find TILA violations in credit card
solicitation materials.234 "[W]e doubt that [Congress] intended for
us to ignore other statements made by those issuers in their credit
card solicitation materials. ' ' 235 Congress, however, excluded a
230. Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, Cmt. 226.5(a)(l)-1
(2003).
231. Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, supra note 5, at 6.
[A]dvertising a "guaranteed" or "lifetime" interest rate could be
misleading when the institution makes the representation despite
an intention to increase the rate. Such an institution could face
reputation or litigation risks if consumers are not provided
information that the institution may unilaterally change the
contract terms.
Id. (emphasis added).
232. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at 282; see also Tyler Chavers, Alexandra
Lossini and Daniece Owsley Burns v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., Fleet Credit Card
Services, L.P., Fleet Credit Card Holdings, Inc., FleetBoston Financial Corporation,
and Does 1-10, No. 00-4237, slip op. at 8 (R.I. Super., 2001) (stating that, although the
federal district court in Rossman (Rossman v. Fleet Bank, 2000 WL 33119419 (E.D.
Pa. 2000)) held that plaintiff failed to allege that Fleet engaged in conduct expressly
prohibited by the TILA, the court did not foreclose the plaintiff's claims under state
law), available at http://www.courts.state.ri.us/superior/pdf/00-5237-7-02-01.pdf (last
visited Feb. 7, 2004).
233. Roberts, 342 F.3d. at 267. "As a result, while we recognize that the TILA only
applies the 'clear and conspicuous' standard to required disclosures, we conclude that
the TILA permits us to consider materials outside of the Schumer Box in
determining whether the credit issuer disclosed the required information clearly and
conspicuously." Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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private cause of action based on credit-advertising violations. 6
The TILA section that imposes civil liability, Section 1640,237
explicitly provides for civil liability with respect to Parts B, D, and
E of Subchapter 1,238 and does not expressly impose civil liability
with respect to Part C and Section 1663,239 which regulate
advertising of open end credit plans.2 0 Thus, Section 1640 clearly
does not confer original subject matter jurisdiction in federal court
over a private individual's allegation of violations of the TILA
Credit Advertising Provisions [Part C]. 241  Moreover, there is no
236. 15 U.S.C. § 1661-1665b (2000). See, e.g., Miller, 921 F. Supp. at 1166 (holding
that TILA does not require disclosure of conditions on promotional inducements that
are not related to credit terms); Clark v. Troy & Nichols, Inc., 864 F.2d 1261, 1264
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the TILA does not provide a cause of action when a
lender engages in 'bait and switch' techniques); Janikowski v. Lynch Ford, Inc., 210
F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "spot delivery" schemes do not violate
TILA). Accord Smeyres v. General Motors Corp., 660 F. Supp. 31, 35 affd 820 F.2d
782, 783-84 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that no private right of action existed under
credit advertising provisions of TILA); see also RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at
273. But see Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 109 F.Supp.2d 352, 358-359, 361 n.8,
361 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that the court may consider language of the TILA when
the notice of the right to rescission required under TILA is rendered unclear by
information presented to the customer outside of the TILA disclosures).
237. TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000). "(Part C, which encompasses §§ 1661-1665a
inclusive) of the Truth In Lending Act (Act). Part C itself is one of five divisions
(Parts A through E) of Subchapter I of the Act (Subchapter I encompasses §§ 1601-
1667e inclusive." Smeyres, 660 F. Supp. at 32.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who
fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this part [Part
BI, including any requirement under section 1635 of this title, or
part D or E of this subchapter [Subchapter I] with respect to any
person is liable... (e) Any action under this section may be
brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of
competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the
occurrence of the violation.
Id. at 33 (quoting TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1640).
238. Id. "The bill is designed to give consumers relevant cost information about
credit and charge cards at a time when they can shop around for the best card." S.
REP. No. 100-259, at 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3937 (1988). See
Smeyres, 660 F. Supp. at 32-3. See, e.g., Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 442 F.2d
78, 81 (8th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870, 92 S.Ct. 78 (1971) (holding that
Review of provisions of this subchapter and the congressional history thereof
discloses that there is "no intent by Congress to provide private civil relief for
violations of this part [Part C]" and "Authority to enforce compliance with credit
advertising requirements of Truth in Lending Act is relegated to administrative
agencies") (emphasis added); Accord Smeyres, 660 F. Supp. at 35.
239. See Supra note 236 and accompanying text.
240. Smeyres, 660 F. Supp. at 33.
241. Jordan, 442 F.2d at 78, 81-2 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870, 92 S.Ct.
78 (1971).
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express civil liability provision within Part C of the TILA.242 The
Third Circuit created a private remedy in Part C, which was never
expressly intended by Congress.243
TILA and Regulation Z do not provide a private cause of
action for improper credit advertising.2 " Misrepresentations or
omissions in the Schumer Box and the IDS provide the consumer
with a statutory remedy for civil damages under §1640, which
includes statutory and actual damages sustained by the borrower
as a result of the lender's disclosure violation.245 Section 1640,
however, provides that a creditor cannot be held liable for any "act
done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule,
regulation, or interpretation thereof by the [Federal Reserve
Board]. 24 6 In Roberts, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the
clear and conspicuous standard applied only to statements made in
the IDS and the Schumer BoX. 247 The court, however, rejected the
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1640, 1663 (2000). See Smeyres, 660 F. Supp. at 32-3.
243. S. REP. No. 100-259 at 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3941 (1988).
Section 2 amends section 127 of the Truth in Lending Act (15
U.S.C. 1637) to require new disclosures in connection with
applications and solicitations for all credit cards.., into separate
provisions for mailed applications and solicitations .... Card
issuers may provide the required disclosures either on or with the
application or solicitation, and the disclosures can be presented on
that part of the application which is returned to the creditor .... If
a card issuer includes an application as part of an advertisement
and, as a result, discloses the information required by section
127(c), the inclusion of this information shall not 'trigger' the
requirement to make additional disclosures under section 143.
Id. (emphasis added).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 1661-1665b (2000).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1640; see RENUART & KEEST, supra note 33, at 273; see also supra
note 37 and accompanying text. In a class action, a lender liable for a TILA violation
is subject to statutory damages even in the absence of any actual damages. See 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a). TILA provides that statutory damages are to be "such as the court
may allow," with no minimum applicable to each class member and a total cap of
either $500,000 or 1 percent of the creditor's net worth, whichever is lower. Id. at §
1640(a)(2)(B). Lenders are also liable for "a reasonable attorney's fee as determined
by the court." Id. at § 1640(a)(3).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f); see Warren v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 599 F.2d 829,
831-32 (7th Cir. 1979).
247. Roberts, 342 F.3d. at 268.
When Congress decided to require credit card issuers to disclose
required terms in a clear and conspicuous manner, we doubt that it
intended for us to ignore other statements made by those issuers in
their credit card solicitation materials. . . . Congress created the
Schumer Box to assist consumers in accessing such information,
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"broader implications', 248 associated with applying the standard
only to those disclosures required by the TILA and Regulation Z,
which could "shield credit card companies from liability for
information placed outside of the Schumer Box., 2 49
Certainly, one of the purposes of TILA is to provide
"meaningful disclosure[s].,, 250  The federal courts have tempered
the possibly expansive definition this term could be afforded to
preserve the simplicity of the Schumer Box.2 1' The federal courts,
not to shield credit card companies from liability for information
placed outside of the Schumer Box. As a result, while we recognize
that the TILA only applies the "clear and conspicuous" standard to
required disclosures, we conclude that the TILA permits us to
consider materials outside of the Schumer Box in determining
whether the credit issuer disclosed the required information clearly
and conspicuously.
Id. at 267-68 (italics added).
248. Id. at 267.
249. Id. at 267-68.
250. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
251. See Miller, 921 F.Supp. at 1166-67. See Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. at
568-69 (quoting S.REP. 96-73, p. 3) (1979) "Meaningful disclosure does not mean
more disclosure. Rather, it describes a balance between "competing considerations of
complete disclosure ... and the need to avoid ... [informational overload.]").
The Truth-in-Lending Act is intended to promote "the informed
use of credit" by asserting "meaningful disclosure of credit terms"
to consumers. The provisions of the Act and implementing
regulations, as remedial legislation, are to be broadly construed in
favor of the consumer to implement this Congressional intent.
'Meaningful disclosure' does not mean, however, more disclosure.
The goal must be carefully balanced against the possibility of
informational overload. I read the Act's requirements in light of its
general purpose - to produce meaningful information to aid credit
consumers.
Milhollin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 531 F.Supp. 379, 383-84 (D.C.Or. 1981) (citations
omitted); Schell v. First Union Direct Bank, 2000 WL 89300, at *2 (N.D.III. Jan 20,
2000) (holding that "no language in either TILA's statutory provisions or its
underlying regulations which require the disclosure of the terms or conditions of a
creditor's promotional program"); see, e.g., Virachack v. University Ford, 259
F.Supp.2d 1089, 1091-92 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that meaningful disclosure
required by TILA does not mean more disclosure; rather, it describes a balance
between competing considerations of complete disclosure and the need to avoid
information overload); see also Stein, 279 F.Supp.2d 286, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 278 (Cal. App. 1998) (stating that
"including a change of terms provisions in account agreements ha[s] been the
standard industry practice since bank credit cards first became available in the
1960's"). Accord Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A2d 304, 311 (Del. Super. 1998)
(approving change in terms increasing "fixed APR"); Samuels v. Old Kent Bank,
1997 WL 458434, at *6-*7 (N.D. I11. Aug. 1, 1997) (approving change in terms
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however, have resisted the temptation to elevate the broader
purposes,"' or legislative goals, of TILA over its specific
provisions.253
In 2000, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a TILA
violation claim in Schnall v. Marine Midland Bank.25 4 Despite the
plaintiff's argument that TILA is a remedial statute that should be
given a broad construction in favor of the consumer, the Second
Circuit relied upon the unaided text of TILA in the absence of
''any illuminating commentary supplied by the Federal Reserve
Board., 255 In Cades v. H&R Block, Inc., the U.S. Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a TILA claim in the
absence of any authority that "the broad purposes of the Act
should override its specific provisions." 256 Similarly, in Bissette v.
Colonial Mortgage Corp. of D.C., the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a mortgagee bank was not required to make
Truth in Lending Act disclosures to the borrowers until closing. 7
It rejected the borrowers' argument that statutory policy required
earlier disclosure, stating that the language of the statute and
regulations was clear. 8  In 1998, in Ellis v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a bank was not liable under the TILA for misrepresenting the
cost of an extended vehicle warranty to justify liability against a
loan assignee.259 The court stated that it was forbidden by the
plain language of § 1641(a) to resort to evidence or documents
eliminating dividend miles program); Fineman v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 591,
596 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985) (approving change of terms increasing annual fee).
252. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 266 "[T]he TILA is a remedial consumer protection
statute, we have held it 'should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer."' Id.
(quoting Rossman, 280 F.3d at 390).
253. See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 226-27.
254. Schnall, 225 F.3d at 267-70.
255. Id. at 267-68.
256. Cades v. H&R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 876 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515
U.S. 1103 (1995).
257. Bissette v. Colonial Mort. Corp. of D.C., 477 F.2d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(holding that liberal construction and interpretation based on legislative purpose can
only go so far. Where the meaning of the statute and regulations is clear, a contrary
reading would become destruction of the statutory scheme, as administered by the
Board).
258. Id. at 1246-47.
259. Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709-10 (11th Cir.
1998).
434 [Vol. 8
CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES
extraneous to the disclosure statement,2 60 despite the TILA's
"clearly remedial purpose., 26' Finally, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a TILA claim in Ramadan v.
Chase Manhattan Corp. 62 The plaintiffs argued that the TILA is a
remedial statute and should be construed liberally in favor of the
consumer in order to find assignee liability under § 1641(a). 263
However, the Third Circuit held that the plain language of §
1641(a) of the TILA does not permit such an expansive
interpretation of what provides adequate assignee notice to trigger
liability under the TILA.26
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVED TILA CREDIT CARD
DISCLOSURES POST-ROBERTS
If Rossman and Roberts are the beginning of a judicial
trend to read every word on a credit card solicitation for TILA
violations, then banking institutions should be aware of guidelines
for managing risk and class action liability.
265
First, a bank's marketing personnel should confirm that the
information provided in the solicitation is a complete and accurate
portrayal of the product offered.266 A credit card issuer should
avoid the use of advertising claims such as "guaranteed," "pre-
approved," and "lifetime rates," if there is at least the possibility
260. Id. at 709-10; see also Green v. Levis Motors, Inc., 179 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir.
1999) (holding that common sense readings of § 1641(a) all point towards the
conclusion that the alleged TILA violations were not apparent on the face of the
Greens' contract, thus, under § 1641(a), Hancock Bank not liable for Levis Motors's
violations).
261. Id. at 708.
262. Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2000).
263. Id. at 197.
264. Id. at 197.
The "or transmitted" clause in Ramadan's restatement is a
significant alteration of the statutory language. Section 1641(a)
recites "other documents assigned," not "other documents
transferred" or "other documents." If the other document is "not
assigned" it does not fall under the statutory definition. A
document transferred but not assigned cannot qualify even under a
liberal construction of the statute.
Id. at 198.
265. Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, supra note 5, at 7.
266. Id. at 8.
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that consumers will not receive the terms as advertised.267 In
Rossman, the court determined that the solicitation described the
credit card as "the no-annual-fee Platinum MasterCard., 268 The
court reasoned that had the disclosure said "no annual fee subject
to change at any time, including in the first year," then the
disclosure would be perfectly accurate. 269 Absent such language,
the court concluded that a reasonable consumer would be entitled
to assume that the issuer would refrain from imposing an annual
fee for at least one year.270
The standard outlined in Regulation Z requires the
disclosures to be "in a reasonably understandable form and readily
noticeable by the consumer. 2 7' First, prior to mailing out
solicitation materials, a bank should review the solicitation or
other communication for language that may conflict with or
contradict required consumer disclosures, such as the TILA or the
FTC Act.272 Such contradiction could lead courts to deem the
disclosures not "clear and conspicuous" for purposes of TILA 3
Under the FTC Act, now enforceable through bank regulatory
agencies, 27  an unclear or contradictory solicitation or
advertisement could be deemed a violation of law because it is an
unfair and deceptive act or practice.275
Second, a credit card issuer or banking institution should
provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure of any contract
provision that will change the terms of the products, benefits, or
services that are offered . 6 Also, a credit card issuer or banking
institution should not promote a product or service in a solicitation
267. Id..
268. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 393.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 394.
271. 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, cmt. 5a(a)(2) (2003).
272. See Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, supra note 5, at 8.
273. Id.
274. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1243-44, 1251. See also FDIC Financial
Institution Letter, supra note 94. The Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, and the OCC
have concluded that they could use Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to
enforce section 5 of the FTC Act governing unfair and deceptive acts and practices in
or affecting commerce. Id.
275. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 9, at 1253-58.
276. Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, supra note 5, at 8.
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that highlights a particular benefit that will be negated by another
aspect of the transaction. 211 "For example, a product should not be
promoted as having "no annual fees" if the product requires the
consumer to pay annual premiums for another linked product,
such as mandatory credit life insurance., 278  Likewise, clearly
notify the consumer at the time of the initial solicitation to act
affirmatively to cancel a service at the end of the "free trial
period" in order to avoid being billed for the service.279
Lastly, monitoring third-party vendor performance by
reviewing scripts used to market products to bank customers is a
major step in avoiding a TILA violation.28" These scripts should be
accurate and concisely describe the terms, benefits, and material
limitations of the product or service being offered.28' If a bank
enters a contract with a third-party vendor, containing financial
incentives to a telemarketer to mislead a consumer, then the bank
may incur civil liability under the TILA or regulatory agency
penalties under FTC Act.282 Maintaining internal procedures
governing consumer complaints can provide issuers with early
detection of violations from improper third party vendor practices,
deceptive telemarketing procedures, and misleading language used
in marketing materials or solicitation campaigns. 283  The FTC
offers guidance letters that outline how to properly word and
disseminate solicitation material to avoid claims under the FTC
Act.
284
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, supra note 5, at 8
282. Id. at 2-8.
283. Id. at 8.
284. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, For Business - Advertising
Guidance, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/guides.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2004); see FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Letter from James C. Miller III,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to Representative John D. Dingell (Oct. 14,
1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm (last visited Feb.
7, 2004); FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, Letter from Michael Pertschuk,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to Representatives Wendell H. Ford and
John C. Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-
unfair.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004); see also Guides Against Bait Advertising, 68
Fed. Reg. 55280 (codified at 16 CFR pt. 238) (2003).
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V. CONCLUSION
Roberts v. Fleet Bank may have drastic influence on how
banks write solicitations, initial disclosure statements, the Schumer
Box, and cardholder agreements.285 The Third Circuit's ruling in
Roberts will subject credit card issuers to a new form of liability
under the TILA. 286 If a credit card issuer offers, or previously
offered, a fixed rate card and did not disclose inside the Schumer
Box the possibility of an increase based upon a change-in-terms
clause, then it will be open to civil liability under the TILA even if
the disclosure forms are consistent with the Model Forms 287
provided by the FRB.288 The Third Circuit's ruling, in the absence
of any language in the TILA or Regulation Z, imposes a duty on
credit card issuers to disclose in the Schumer Box the issuer's right
to increase the APR at any time; however, the Official Staff
Commentary prohibits such disclosures in the Schumer Box. 289 The
Roberts decision, devoid of any substantial basis in case law,
statutory law, regulatory law, or Congressional legislative history,
inflicts unnecessary and substantial liability on credit card
issuers.29° It is well established that courts may not enlarge by
construction the language of a clear and unambiguous statute.29'
285. MaryClaire Dale, supra note 118, at B01.
286. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers Association, supra note 210, at
16 n.12. See also 12 C.F.R., App. G, Forms 10A and 10B; "Creditors using the
appropriate model forms are deemed to be in compliance with the TILA's disclosure
provision. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supp. I, Apps. G & H, Cmt. 1."
287. See Official Staff Comment, at 58909-10. Specifically, G10A and G10B. Id.
288. Id.
289. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(a)(2)-4 (2003).
290. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers Association, supra note 210, at
16. "Not only would they be subject to statutory damages of up to $500,000, plus
attorneys' fees and court costs, 15 U.S.C § 1640(a), issuers who actually invoke their
right to change terms would, like Fleet, also find themselves defending TILA claims
for actual damages." Id. at 16-17.
291. See Beattie Investment Co. v. United States, 101 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 1939).
"The fact that it may be a seeming injustice in some cases is therefore not a matter
which the courts have power to correct. Congress alone can give relief in such a
case." Id. (citing Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 54 S.Ct. 599, 78 L.Ed. 1109;
Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780); see also supra note
54 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has ruled that courts may not expand
292by construction the language of a clear and unambiguous statute.
Congress expressly desired consumers to avoid the uninformed use
of credit.293  By assuring a meaningful disclosure of credit terms
through the Schumer Box, Congress hoped the consumer would be
able to readily compare the various credit terms available. 94
When Congress amended TILA in 1988, Congress emphasized its
intent to provide "more detailed and uniform disclosure by credit
and charge card issuers, at the time of application or
solicitation. 295  Furthermore, the amendment gave consumers
"early disclosure of relevant cost information from credit card
companies., 296 Congress then delegated the responsibility of
"prescribing regulations to carry out the purposes" of TILA to the
Federal Reserve Board. 297 If a regulation issued by an agency is
unclear, then a court may interpret the regulation to resolve the
ambiguity.2 98 However, if the regulation is clear and unambiguous,
as in Roberts, then the court should defer to the expert agency's
regulation, especially when the agency is the comprehensive
regulator of a technical activity, such as consumer credit
disclosures. 299 In Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co.,300 the
292. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Beattie Investment Co.,
101 F.2d at 852.
293. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
294. Id.
295. S.Rep. No. 100-259, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3937.
296. Id.
297. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2000). "[T]raditional acquiescence in administrative
expertise is particularly apt under TILA, because the Federal Reserve Board has
played a pivotal role in setting the statutory machinery in motion." Ford Motor
Credit Co., 444 U.S. 555, 566 (citations omitted) (holding that courts must defer to
Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing TILA or the underlying regulations
unless such opinions are "demonstrably irrational").
298. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
299. Benion v. Bank One, 144 F.3d 1056, 1059 (7th Cir. 1998).
When an activity of a technical and specialized character is
comprehensively regulated by an expert agency, as consumer
credit disclosures are comprehensively regulated by the Federal
Reserve Board (and no one doubts that this particular agency is a
repository of genuine expertise), courts should generally leave the
plugging of loopholes to the agency, lest the court's reparative
efforts create confusion and disrupt the regulatory scheme.
Id. See also supra note 257.
300. Gennuso, 566 F.2d at 443 (3d Cir. 1977).
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Third Circuit stated that whether the technical requirements of the
TILA and Regulation Z work for or against the creditor, "[a]ny
misgivings about the technical nature of the requirements under
the Act or Regulation should be addressed to Congress and the
Federal Reserve Board, not to this court. 30'
In a court case principally involving the TILA, a federal
court said that "[i]t appears to be all too easy, in the light of some
reported cases, for courts to abdicate the realm of reality. The
required disclosures must be strictly required and enforced by the
courts, but the courts should not condone or give credence to suits
which attempt to subvert the Act [TILA] into an instrument of
harassment and oppression of the lending industry.""3 2  By
expanding credit card issuer liability, the Third Circuit's decision
advanced the cause of consumerism and, in effect, created a new
area of TILA class action liability for deceptive advertising by
credit card issuers.0 3
The Third Circuit's consumer activism in Roberts is noble;
however, it was accomplished at the expense of applying sound
legal analysis.3" Expressed Congressional intent, explicit
provisions in the TILA statute and accompanying Regulation Z,
and relevant case law were completely disregarded for what the
Third Circuit believed was Congress' implicit desire to include
solicitation materials in the analysis of the TILA disclosure
statement violation. 35 By comparison to the vast ocean of TILA
301. Id.
302. Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 452 F. Supp. 465, 468 (S.D. Il1. 1978).
303. Supra notes 149-54, 223-62 and accompanying text
304. Supra notes 159-264.
305. See Roberts, 342 F.3d at 267. "[W]e doubt that [Congress] intended for us to
ignore other statements made by those issuers in their credit card solicitation
material. Because '[t]he purpose of the TILA is to assure 'meaningful' disclosures,'
we have recognized that '[t]he accuracy demanded excludes not only literal falsities,
but also misleading statements.' Rossman, 280 F.3d at 390 (citations omitted)." Id.
First, the main thrust of the Rossman holding was based upon the misleading
statements made about the annual fee in the TILA disclosure form, not in the
advertising material. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 389-91.
Second, the court said "'The accuracy demanded excludes not only literal
falsities, but also misleading statements."' Roberts, 342 F.3d at 266 (citing Genusso,
566 F.2d at 443). The Third Circuit in Genusso court was addressing misleading
statements made in the TILA disclosure form, not in advertising material. Gennuso,
566 F.2d at 443 (holding that under Truth in Lending regulation providing that
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case law, this court's decision in Roberts is not an example of
historic judicial reasoning but simply "another example of
consumerism gone berserk. 3
6
JOHN A. MAROLD
disclosure of terms of consumer credit loan shall not be stated, utilized, or placed so
as to mislead or confuse consumer).
Third, the Roberts court concluded that the legislative intent of Congress in
drafting the TILA, and subsequently amending it with the FCCCDA, was to assure
meaningful disclosures by financial institutions that "exclude[d] not only literal
falsities, but also misleading statements." Roberts, 342 F.3d at 267-68 (citations
omitted). The Third Circuit then decided that Congress created the Schumer Box to
help consumers in accessing financial information "not to shield credit card companies
from liability for information placed outside of the Schumer Box." Id. (italics added).
Though the court recognized that the TILA only applies the clear and conspicuous
standard to required disclosures, the court concluded "that the TILA permits us to
consider materials outside of the Schumer Box in determining whether the credit
issuer disclosed the required information clearly and conspicuously." Roberts, 342
F.3d at 268 (italics added).
In sum, the court's analysis is erroneous because the TILA provides a private
cause of action for misleading statements made in the disclosure forms, the IDS and
Schumer Box. See supra notes 177 and 217 with accompanying text. If Congress
intended to impose civil liability for misleading statements made in solicitation
materials it would have done explicitly in the TILA. See supra notes 217-223 with
accompanying text. However, Congress when it drafted the FTC Act does imposed
liability to any business that makes misleading, false, or deceptive statements in
solicitations, but presently no private right of action exists under the FTC Act. See
supra notes 89-97 with accompanying text; see also Lauletta v. Valley Buick, Inc., 421
F.Supp. 1036, 1040 (W.D. Pa.1976).
[m]any of the requirements of the Truth-In-Lending Act are
technical in nature, and the Court is not at liberty to deviate from
them as it sees fit. Regulation Z unequivocally requires that
necessary disclosures shall be written and made together on one
document .... Regardless of the wisdom or validity of that
proposition, it is not this Court's prerogative to substitute its own
view for that of Congress.
Id. (emphasis added).
306. David Breitkopf, FleetBoston Scores a Truth-in-Lending Victory, AM.
BANKER, January 8, 2001, at 12.

